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The strategies pursued 
by Mexican firms 
in their efforts to 
become global players 
Almost 60% of the biggest non-financial groups in Mexico 
carry on at least two types of activities in transnational mar-
kets. This article describes and analyses the various interna-
tionalization paths and strategies of Mexican finns. This 
drive for internationalization is taking place against the 
background of an open export-oriented economy and grow-
ing integration with the United States and Canada. There are 
various national and international factors, as well as others 
specific to the firms themselves, which influence the strate-
gies chosen and their results. This article consists of an intro-
duction (section I), followed by six sections analysing the 
various paths followed by Mexican firms in order to become 
"global players". Section II identifies the firms which have 
set up subsidiaries in developed countries. Section III re-
views the firms which have resorted to strategic alliances 
thatcould convert them into transnational corporations, and 
some outstanding examples of this are cited. Section IV de-
scribes the presence of Mexican firms on the international 
securities markets and the interaction that this involves with 
world financial institutions. Section V looks at the strategies 
followed by some Mexican firms in order to establish global 
marketing networks. Section VI examines the rapid expan-
sion of the solutions and strategies applied by firms to gain a 
world-level position, and finally section VII offers some 
conclusions evaluating the paths and preferences of Mexican 
firms seeking to become transnationals, the obstacles they 
have had to overcome, and the consequences of their interna-
tional activities. 
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I 
Introduction 
This article focuses on the processes followed by 
Mexican corporations in order become global play-
ers: that is to say, to attain a situation where their 
action is ruled, shaped and modified not only, or not 
fundamentally, by national processes and in which 
increasing influence over their organizational struc-
ture and corporate action is exerted by the greater 
interaction and feed-back with transnational institu-
tions and agents operating through manufacturing, fi-
nancial, trade and corporate networks that have 
attained a global outreach. 
The purpose of this article is to see which Mexi-
can corporations have become global enterprises and 
what strategies they pursued in order to do this; how 
Mexican entrepreneurs, by virtue of their transna-
tional action and strategies, become global players 
and transform the structural constraints that limit the 
scope of their action and corporate organization; to 
what extent they overcome such constraints; and why 
they changed their strategies only late in the 1980s, 
when other newly industrialized countries (the Asian 
Tigers, for example) had already made great ad-
vances in this direction (Tseng, 1994). In other 
words, what forces set this process in motion? 
Hie emphasis throughout the article will be on 
the level of the agent: an agent who is well informed 
of the significance of the present conjuncture and the 
opportunities and costs underlying the transition to 
global status. Other questions will also be addressed 
at this level: how Mexican entrepreneurs challenge 
and react to the ways, conditions and rules under 
which they interact with the global system, and how 
they articulate and activate a strategic, conscious 
drive to become global, to interact and compete with 
global forces, and to plan their action and, increas-
ingly, their very organizational structure. 
In view of this emphasis on the level of the 
agent, the definition of transnational corporations 
(TNCS) used in this article necessarily underscores the 
strategic and operational logic underlying global ac-
tion. Thus, for the purposes of the present analysis a 
global (transnational) enterprise is defined as a 
highly complex business organization that has ex-
panded its operations to several countries by at least 
two of the following means: 
i) Operation of subsidiaries: usually acquired in \ 
order to gain a global position in certain products, 
outrank competitors and simultaneously defend the 
firm's own domestic market from massive and/or 
dumped imports. This new emphasis on positioning 
and/or benchmarking will be the main consideration 
when planning growth. Accordingly, Mexican corpo-
rations that reach global status must gauge and im-
prove their competitiveness not in relation to national 
standards but in relation to their closest global com-
petitors. 
ii) Strategic alliances: multiple and diversified 
combinations with TNCs from advanced or develop-
ing countries, entailing segmentation, specialization, 
sectoral and/or geographic redistribution of markets; 
combination of distribution networks, technological 
management and marketing expertise; and exchange 
of top executives and directors. The nature of the 
link-up transcends that of the more generalized joint 
ventures or technology or marketing licensing of the 
1960s and 1970s. 
ÍÜ) Sale of stock and other securities on foreign 
markets. This requires, on the one hand, sophisticated 
systems of information and communication with in-
stitutional investors, investment bankers, brokers and 
different specialized agents, and on the other hand, a 
more open attitude towards the public in general and 
stakeholders in particular (creditors, management, 
clients, consumers, employees and stockholders). 
iv) Networking: distribution and marketing net-
works strategically developed by the corporation to 
promote and commercialize its own or other Mexican 
exports, particularly in the United States or other in-
dustrialized countries. In this way, the corporations 
no longer rely on agents or brokers to export their 
products and they considerably diversify their 
sources of revenue. 
Many large and medium-sized Mexican compa-
nies are exploring new avenues for opening new mar-
kets, and it is difficult at this point to assess whether 
they will be successful or not. Using the criterion of 
a more diversified presence in foreign markets (in at 
least two types of activities), I have attempted to de-
termine that they have a firm footing in the global 
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economy and are more deeply involved in the global 
rules of the game. 
All these activities presuppose intense interac-
tion and collective planning with global agents from 
advanced capitalist countries. Information exchange 
and communication with customers, suppliers, inves-
tors, creditors, partners and allies make collective 
planning and decision-making increasingly complex, 
but necessary. This interaction, in turn, influences the 
enterprises' course of action and promotes strategies 
and patterns of behaviour like those widely used 
in the advanced countries. However, it also pro-
vokes, as we shall see, difficulties and contradictions 
that demand sophisticated responses, short-and long-
term planning, and meticulous monitoring of all the 
enterprises' activities in Mexico and abroad. In other 
Ever since the 1970s, many Mexican corporations 
have extended their operations to other Third World 
markets, in predominantly defensive strategies de-
signed to protect export markets, alleviate the con-
traction of demand in Mexico, diversify sources of 
foreign income, or at least reduce dependence on one 
country. In the 1990s, however, the new global play-
ers have penetrated industrialized markets and have 
rapidly achieved a very strong position and high 
ranking in their specific areas of operation. Table 1 
shows that of the 60 largest non-financial groups,3 
only 13 have operating affiliates (i.e., value-adding 
activities) in industrialized countries, though many 
more have prospects, or are looking for prospects, of 
growth through mergers and acquisitions. 
It would be difficult to trace the evolution of 
every case. I have chosen to examine three key cases 
in more detail (Vitro, Cemex and Televisa) for sev-
eral reasons: (1) they all explicitly revealed the drive 
1
 That is, links with firms which do or do not belong to the 
corporation. 
2
 As we shall see, participation in international trade has dra-
matically changed the nature of Mexican corporations' involve-
ment in the international markets. Although foreign investment 
was not altogether absent before, it was oriented either to other 
less developed countries or, as indirect or real-estate invest-
ments, to advanced capitalist countries. 
words, spontaneous reaction to market signals and 
to public policies gives way to an increasingly com-
plex process of strategic planning and decision-
making. Without this process it would not be possible 
to integrate national and transnational activities, nor 
to coordinate internalized and externalized1 alliances 
and corporate networks. It would not even be possi-
ble to follow up all the enterprises* activities, much 
less to comply with the standards of their new global 
status. This process of strategic collective planning 
underlying their global action is in my view the 
main difference with respect to any previous par-
ticipation by these firms in international markets and 
not, as Peres Núñez (1993, p. 56) claims, a shift from 
foreign trade and debt towards foreign direct invest-
ment.2 
to become global and the courses of action followed 
in order to advance in that direction; (2) they have all 
pursued very aggressive strategies to expand their ac-
tivities to other countries, gain a global position and 
integrate their operations in order to profit from firm-
specific advantages and synergies; and (3) a very 
large proportion of their revenue and value-added 
originates abroad.4 
Vitro started making forays into the United 
States market with the acquisition of Anchor Glass 
and Latchford Glass, so that in 1989 it became the 
second-largest producer of glass containers in the 
United States, with this market accounting for ap-
proximately 40% of Vitro's total sales in 1990, 59% 
in 1992 and 56% in 1993. The transaction exposed 
the group to new, sophisticated rules of the game. In 
Mexico's business environment acquisitions usually 
1
 In order to examine the main avenues of development of big 
business and the strategies employed in order to become global, 
I constructed a list of the 60 largest non-financial groups and a 
list of the IS largest financial groups according to sales and 
assets (the main criteria used to rank non-financial and financial 
groups, respectively). The list was prepared on the basis of sales 
revenue and assets in 1994 as reported by Expansión 500, the 
Mexican Stock Exchange and the firms' annual reports. 
4
 Unless otherwise specified, the information comes from inter-
views (see the list of interviews at the end of this article), 
Annual Reports and Offering Circulars. 
II 
Establishment of affiliates 
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take place through friendly deals. This was the first 
time a Mexican corporation had attempted a hostile 
takeover of a United States concern and, according to 
Wall Street analysts the price paid was "overly gener-
ous", particularly considering that Anchor had re-
ported losses the year before and that the glass 
industry was in crisis, facing strong competition from 
plastic containers.3 Throughout the negotiations VI-
tro's top executives exhibited the will to go global: 
"If we want to continue to be a glass company, as we 
have been for 80 years, we can no longer be satisfied 
with having a strong domestic base and some export 
activity", said Ernesto Martens, Chief Executive 
Officer, before the deal was over (The New York 
Times, 1989 and Wall Street Journal, 1989). By 1997, 
however, this venture had failed and Vitro had to sell 
its investments in Anchor Glass and retreat back to 
the Mexican market. 
Cemex's expansion into the international market 
has also been achieved primarily through acquisi-
tions. In 1995 sales generated outside Mexico (con-
sidering exports and international operating income) 
represented almost half of its total revenue. In 1989 
the group bought several companies in Texas and 
California which gave it a tenth of the United 
States sunbelt market. In 1992 Cemex paid US$ 1.85 
billion for Spain's two largest cement firms -La 
Valenciana and Sansón- which represented 28% of 
the Spanish cement market. 
The international stock market community -par-
ticularly those closely watching Latin American 
stock- considered these acquisitions a very risky 
move for several reasons: the company had little ex-
perience managing overseas operations; the acquisi-
tions increased its long-term debt by US$ 760 million, 
and they increased the company's immediate borrow-
ing by US$ 1.35 billion. 
United States and European investors who had 
recently acquired Cemex stock resented what they 
considered an arbitrary, unilateral decision about 
which they had not been properly informed in pre-
vious prospectuses and presentations. Two days after 
the deal was announced the price of Cemex's shares 
dropped by 17%.6 The decision by security market 
3
 The original offer was for US$ 251.4 million and the final 
cost was US$ 390 million for the capital and US$ 460 million 
for the debt (US$ 900 million altogether, including Latchford 
Glass). 
6
 See Euromoney (1993) and Financial Times (1992). 
agents to dump Cemex's stock led the company's top 
management to organize several presentations in or-
der to demonstrate that their strategy was sound and 
promising. The market community, however, remained 
sceptical for some time about the Cemex manage-
ment's capability to operate in European markets 
(Interview 2). 
Despite all the uneasiness and opposition from 
the market community, Cemex's top management 
pursued an aggressive strategy. From 1993 to 1996 
the group expanded considerably to South and Cen-
tral America, and by 1996 its sphere of influence 
included 20 countries (see table 1). Underneath this 
aggressive strategy was Cemex's decision to become 
global and to simultaneously defend its market inside 
and outside Mexico. "The global cement business is 
becoming increasingly concentrated and we need to 
stay with the leaders", said Lorenzo Zambrano, Chief 
Executive and controlling shareholder (Financial 
Times, 1992). The spectacular demand for Cemex 
bonds in May 19937 demonstrated that the group's 
strategy was finally approved by the global financial 
community. 
Televisa, the television and media company, also 
had to fight its way into the United States market. 
The first two forays -Spanish International Network 
(SIN) and The National- were not successful, and in 
1986 the group was accused of illegal practices and 
had to undergo a complicated legal dispute. The Fed-
eral Communications Commission found that the 
firm was violating restrictions on foreign ownership8 
and Emilio Azcárraga Milmo sold the stations to 
Hallmark Cards Inc., who agreed to continue with the 
same management structure. The group was forced to 
retreat, partially and temporarily at least, from the 
Spanish television network in the United States. 
Soon after that, Televisa tried to penetrate the 
United States television market once again, but this 
time with a different ally. In association with Jerrold 
Perrenchio from California (who was to share 75% of 
the television stations and 50% of the network) and 
Gustavo Cisneros (President of Venevisión), who 
was to have a similar share to that of Televisa, ap-
proval was finally obtained from the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) (Expansión, 1992). 
7
 See the section on global securities markets. 
8
 United States legislation prohibits more than 20% foreign own-
ership of television stations. 
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TABLE 1 











































































































































Sources: América Economía ( 1993-1994), Infosel, Reuters and Annual Meeting Reports of companies quoted on the Mexican Stock 
Exchange. 
Univisa controls the international distribution of 
Televisa's Spanish programmes, which means that 
the group bypassed the ownership restrictions on 
foreigners in the United States by selling its pro-
grammes to a group of stations over which it exer-
cises management control. Thus, although it was 
partially and temporarily prevented from operating 
stations itself, the group manoeuvred in such a way 
that it ultimately recovered and strengthened its posi-
tion in the United States Spanish television market. 
Today, this media empire covers 90% of the North 
American Spanish network, plus 18% of that of 
Spain, and it has expanded through a series of joint 
ventures to Chile, Peru, Argentina and Venezuela 
(see table 1), now leading the world in the production 
of Spanish-language television programmes (Inter-
view 7). 
Other Mexican corporations have operating af-
filiates in the United States or other industrialized 
countries but have not yet gained an important posi-
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tion. Those that have become global players had to 
struggle to make headway and defend their space in 
the domestic and foreign markets. They had to use 
different investment strategies; to play by different 
bargaining rules; to learn different financial, legal 
and fiscal practices, and to operate in a much more 
aggressive and strictly regulated institutional frame-
work. 
Ill 
There is no broad agreement yet as to a basic defini-
tion of strategic alliances. Since these represent one 
of the new practices most characteristic of global ac-
tion, some key traits must be identified in order to be 
able to assess the degree to which Mexican corporate 
alliances have become truly strategic. 
The literature tends to underscore cooperation, 
collaboration and complementarity as the principles 
guiding the formation of this type of corporate 
alliance. Strategic alliance networks are assumed to 
be non-hierarchical and self-regulating, conflict is by 
and large absent, and when it is present it is 
considered deviant and rare (Alter and Hage, 1993, 
pp. 189-195). The scant attention given to conflict in 
the literature may in part stem from the fact that these 
and other scholars have focused on strategic alliances 
involving TNCs based in advanced capitalist coun-
tries. These corporations are more likely to have 
similar levels of strength. Consequently, it would be 
difficult at this point to arrive at a definition that 
would also embrace the particularities of alliances 
between corporations based respectively in advanced 
and in newly industrialized countries, since this kind 
of alliance is a relatively new and rapidly changing 
phenomenon which involves corporations of differ-
ent size and strength. However, some of the most 
important traits of strategic alliances which ought to 
be present are: i) a combination of strengths and as-
sets; ii) a gradual, intense and often multi-stage 
process of deliberation which develops consensus, a 
strong sense of common interest and active collective 
management practices; and iii) a need for local busi-
ness control and adaptation to the national, economic 
Even when they relied on specialized teams of 
consultants and financial advisors, the undertakings 
have been complex and dangerous. The new ventures 
have demanded very little (arid sometimes no) real 
new Mexican investment, but, as Vitro's failure in the 
United States glass industry shows, the new players 
are gambling with resources accumulated over a long 
historical period. 
and cultural environment (Alter and Hage,1993; 
Lorange and Roos, 1992). 
In the particular case of strategic alliances in-
volving Mexican corporations, the network of al-
lied firms is very dynamic and contradictory, as we 
shall see below. However, the need for comple-
mentary assets draws the national and foreign corpora-
tions closer together: the Mexican partner usually 
wants to become more active in the international 
arena and gain access to foreign markets and state-
of-the-art technology, while the foreign partner 
aims at gaining access to the Mexican growth 
potential (Jurgensen, 1993). 
Some of the most outstanding strategic alliances 
recently undertaken by Mexican firms reveal not 
only the scope of the relation but the strength -and, 
as we shall see, the weaknesses as well- of the 
emerging Mexican global players. They also show a 
sectoral redistribution and segmentation of markets 
that become increasingly important in the light of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
the formation of a North American regional market. 
As may be seen from table 2, the number of 
alliances has grown rapidly in the past few years. 
However, only a few have a clear-cut strategic profile 
as a multipurpose agreement combining manufac-
turing, distribution, marketing, investment and/or 
organizational resources. Among the most important 
are Vitro-Corning, Cifra-WalMart and Modelo-
Anheuser Busch. 
Even though it collapsed after two years, the 
Vitro-Corning alliance may be considered a paradig-
matic case for several reasons: it was conceived in 
From conventional joint ventures 
to strategic alliances 
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Source: Jurgensen (1993); América Economía (1993-1994); Annual Meeting Reports and offering circulars of corporations, and journals 
listed in the Bibliography. 
* Alliances that enabled Mexican groups to expand their operations to global markets. 
b
 This alliance aborted in December 1993. 
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more egalitarian terms, it soon became a case which 
other Mexican corporations tried to emulate, and it 
entailed a gradual process of negotiation which lasted 
months and was preceded by an intense interaction 
and previous, more traditional, links. 
A closer look at its characteristics reveals that, in 
contrast with the traditional joint ventures of the 
1970s, which generally gave access or facilitated the 
entry of First-World TNCs to the Mexican market, the 
Vitro-Corning alliance was a double joint venture. 
The two companies exchanged assets in their con-
sumer glass interests. The transaction would enhance 
Vitro's position in the United States market, and the 
alliance was complementary in other respects as well. 
There was not much overlapping of similar products, 
allowing a segmentation of markets according to the 
income-levels and preferences of consumers, and the 
combination of distribution networks and marketing 
skills was supposed to benefit both of the parties. 
Neither of the companies had developed distribution 
systems in the other country, due to the trade barriers 
prevailing until the 1990s. Last, but not least, a re-
shuffle of Directors and top executives was also 
agreed. 
Although Vitro has become involved in at least 
two other strategic alliances under the concept of a 
double joint venture and nine joint ventures of a 
more traditional kind, the failure of Vitro-Corning SA 
reveals some of the great difficulties in attempting to 
gain access to the global corporate network. Accord-
ing to Coming's top officials the separation was due 
to different management philosophies (Business Mex-
ico, 1994). But Adrián Sada G., Chairman of Vitro's 
Board at the time, attributed the failure to the fact 
that "NAFTA does not... favour Mexican manufactur-
ers of glassware products for the kitchen and table." 
(Vitro, 1993, p. 4). The alliance was therefore rede-
fined to cover only marketing. 
Bleeke and Ernst (1991, p. 129) anticipate prob-
lems for strategic alliances between companies of 
disparate size and strength: 
When one partner is weak, managing the alli-
ance seems to be too great a distraction from 
improvement needed in other parts of the busi-
ness. When unbalanced partnerships do succeed, 
it is usually because the strong partner brings 
the capability that is crucial to the venture; it 
pulls the weaker partner along for a while be-
fore acquiring it or finding another partner. 
While it is important that partners have comple-
mentary skills and capabilities, an even balance 
of strength is also crucial. This is especially true 
in product-for-market swaps. When one partner 
brings a product or technology and the other 
brings access to desirable markets, there is often 
a certain amount of suspicion. Each partner 
fears that the other will try to usurp its proprie-
tary advantage. 
The fate of both the Vitro-Corning and the Cifra-
WalMart alliances seem to confirm this opinion. The 
first-named case has already been examined above. 
In the latter case, the stronger partner (WalMart) took 
over the weaker partner around six years after they 
started the link-up. In 1991 Cifra, Mexico's largest 
retailer, teamed up with WalMart, the largest retailer 
in the United States. The link-up covered several pro-
jects in both countries (Interview 5). In 1997 the 
Mexican partners agreed to sell the controlling share, 
arguing problems of family generational turnover. 
Modelo and Anheuser-Busch, the leading brew-
ers in Mexico and the United States, respectively, 
joined forces in April 1993. The link-up included 
four areas: i) the acquisition by Anheuser-Busch of 
17% of the equity of Modelo, with the option to buy 
up to 30%; ii) Modelo will remain the exclusive im-
porter and distributor of Budweiser and other brands 
of the United States brewery; iii) Anheuser-Busch 
will be given three seats on Modelo's board of direc-
tors and a Modelo representative will be appointed to 
the Anheuser-Busch board; and iv) there will be rota-
tion of executive and management personnel be-
tween these corporations, particularly in the areas of 
marketing, planning and finance.9 The fate of this 
alliance has not been decided, but many fear that 
Anheuser will eventually buy out full control. 
Table 2 shows the growing number of associa-
tions Mexican groups have formed, each of which 
may involve different arrangements. The cases exam-
ined in more detail, however, shed light on the nature 
of the global network. Strategic alliances link up two 
or more global firms in a corporate network. Each 
may fulfil, however, a different function. Some or-
ganizations may hold central positions, whereas oth-
ers remain marginal, particularly when overall 
decisions are being taken affecting the articulation 
and dynamics of the network. Thus, collaboration 
9
 See Business Mexico, 1993, p. 14, and Latin American News-
letters, 1993. 
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and integration of the manifold and extremely differ-
entiated functions take place only after a complex 
process of negotiation ruled by a global institutional 
framework. Not all the global players participate to 
the same extent in the fonnulation of the global rules 
shaping and constraining strategic choices. 
IV 
Expansion to global securities markets 
During the 1980s, most Latin American corporations 
could not participate in international financial mar-
kets, except to renegotiate debt, swap debt for equity 
capital and, later, buy back their own paper at dis-
count rates. All of these negotiations, however, en-
tailed a process of learning how to manoeuvre in the 
global financial circuits, paving the way for the more 
aggressive and sophisticated undertakings of the 
1990s. 
Before the groups could pursue any negotiations, 
however, the Mexican Government had to bail them 
out. Through a very complex mechanism -Ficorca-10 
the government underwrote the private foreign debt.11 
Most of the largest groups -especially those from 
Monterrey- would have defaulted if the government 
had not intervened.12 The second half of the decade 
offered private corporations the opportunity of buy-
ing public debt paper at attractive discounts. In April 
1987, the Mexican Government allowed Mexican 
private investors to buy Mexican sovereign debt in 
the secondary market and to use it to redeem their 
own foreign debt. The Mexican foreign debt was pur-
chased at 50%-60% of its value and was redeemed in 
pesos by the government at around 90% of its value. 
If it was used to prepay foreign debt in Ficorca it was 
taken at its face value (i.e., 100%). Some groups 
10
 This trust -Ficorca- provided a mechanism whereby, once 
they had reached an agreement with foreign credit institutions to 
defer the terms of redemption, corporations registered under the 
Ficorca programme would be eligible (o buy the foreign cur-
rency needed to pay the debt interest and principal at subsidized, 
fixed rates. The Ficorca programme offered different options for 
buying the foreign currency needed to pay interest and principal. 
11
 Garrido and Quintana (1987) have assessed the total transfers 
of funds made by Ficorca to private groups. 
12
 Alfa and Moctezuma did indeed default because it took them 
a very long time to reach agreement with their creditors. Alfa 
had 170 creditors when it started renegotiations, and the sheer 
number of agents involved slowed down the process consider-
ably. 
profited enormously from this situation and from 
other debt-reduction innovations. 
The opening of the Mexican economy and, later, 
the negotiations to form NAFTA forced many corpora-
tions to strengthen their position. To be able to de-
fend their markets in Mexico they had to become 
larger, competitive, more efficient and more produc-
tive. The new wave of mergers, reshuffles and invest-
ments in the new modern technology needed to cut 
costs also meant the reorganization of the capital 
structure and greater access to the international secu-
rities market This, in turn, meant greater familiarity 
with transnational standards of disclosure, accounting 
and information. 
The first incursions in the global securities mar-
kets, from 1989 to the beginning of 1992, were 
aimed at the equity markets. From April to June 1992 
most Mexican stock issues circulating in the global 
markets through American Depositary Receipts/ 
Global Depositary Receipts (ADR/GDR)13 plummeted 
because the market was saturated, according to some 
analysts. But by the end of 1992 a great variety of 
complex debt and equity instruments were being 
used. Participation in international roadshows and 
presentations to market analysts and fund managers 
became part of the new function of financial promo-
tion and planning. Specialized management teams for 
financial promotion were often created in the corpo-
rate structures. 
Table 3 shows that between 1989 and 1992 over 
35 Mexican corporations entered the international 
stock market with ADRS or GDRS. Only 20 of these 
companies were fully registered with the United 
13
 ADRs/GDRs are receipts circulating on international stock 
markets which represent stock in a company. The stock is depos-
ited in a neutral trust, usually Nafinsa, which then issues re-
ceipts representing that stock. The holder of such a receipt has 
the right to receive profits, but no voting rights. 
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States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).14 
Trie remainder of these issues trade "Over the 
Counter" in the institutional markets (pension and in-
surance funds), where they are more protected from 
hostile takeovers, leveraged buy-outs and other ag-
gressive investment strategies (MacKee (éd.), 1989). 
Several Mexican groups (Femsa, Vitro and ICA) 
used ADRs/GDRs to finance acquisition or investment 
programmes, while other groups used them to reor-
ganize proprietary interests. During the process of 
reprivatization of the banks, bridge loans were par-
tially paid with proceedings from secondary or pri-
mary offers (of ADRS/GDRS), and the government also 
used this device to complement Telmex's privatiza-
tion programme (Salas-Porras, 1997). 
Most of the expansion into international markets, 
whether through acquisitions, joint ventures or strate-
gic alliances, has been undertaken with little or no 
new investment. Very sophisticated financial opera-
tions, including debt swaps at heavily discounted 
prices, had to be engineered to reshuffle proprietary 
interests on a global level,15 and certain Mexican 
companies had a favourable position for several rea-
sons: i) NAFTA had remarkably changed the percep-
tion of risk for Mexican issues; ii) international 
investors began to demand Latin American paper be-
cause it offered, on average, better returns; iii) most 
Mexican groups trading in global markets achieved 
low levels of leverage in the 1990s; and iv) some 
groups had large cash flow potential. 
In 1993, many analysts and investors considered 
Mexico more favourably than the rest of Latin Amer-
ica. The very good reception of almost all Mexican 
debt issues launched between 1992 and 1993 con-
Only those companies which are fully registered can trade 
directly on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Not all Mexi-
can groups can meet the disclosure requirements demanded by 
the SBC, i.e., more frequent and more complete reports, history 
of operations for the last five years, and use to be made of 
proceeds when offering new stock or paper. Companies listed on 
the NYSE are more closely regulated, implying less risk for indi-
vidual investors who cannot trade over the counter (OTC). There-
fore, fully registered companies have access to funds from 
individual investors, who give the institutional markets much 
greater marketability. Only institutional investors operate in the 
OTC market, which has lower liquidity. In the OTC markets 
transactions are conducted through a telephone and computer 
network connecting stock and bond dealers (brokerage houses or 
investment banks), rather than on the floor of an organized ex-
change (Downes and Goodman, 1995). 
ñrms this perception. Most of the issues shown in 
table 4 had to raise the original offering because they 
were over-subscribed and were priced at relatively 
low rates considering the conditions of the markets 
for high-risk countries. Undoubtedly the largest and 
most successful issue was launched by Cemex in 
May 1993. The demand was so great that the offering 
had to be increased from an original US$ 600 million 
to US$ 1 billion. This and other issues launched in 
1991 and 1992 (see table 4) certainly satisfied the 
financial needs arising from Cemex's recent acquisi-
tions in Mexico (Empresas Tolteca in 1989 and Ce-
mentos Hidalgo in 1993) and Spain (La Valenciana and 
Sansón in 1992) and the new investment prospects 
mentioned above.16 Cemex would not have been able 
to engage in these multi-million-dollar global trans-
actions if its leverage had been high and its cash flow 
potential low. However, the opposite was true. In 
spite of all the debt paper issued during 1993, at the 
end of the year its leverage (total liabilities/total as-
sets) was only 50% and its cash flow represented 
30% of sales (cash flow from net earnings/net sales). 
The shift from private negotiations 'and credit 
contracts with foreign banks and financial institutions 
to the issue of different and complex equity and debt 
instruments as a means of obtaining foreign funds 
took a whole decade (1982-1992). The multiple rela-
tions and contradictions with numerous agents of the 
global securities market -leading agents, institutional 
investors, investment bankers, fund managers, bro-
kers, etc.- put pressure on the groups and forced 
them to rapidly change their corporate structure, 
practices and strategies. Disclosure, accountancy and 
information practices became more open. Some 
groups reorganized their corporate structure by sec-
tors to respond to the needs of certain pension funds 
focusing their investments by economic sectors. The 
short-term strategy of the international market com-
munity forced Mexican groups to offer quarterly in-
formation and results. 
15
 According to Michatet (1991, p. 43) the process of globaliza-
tion is different from the multinational process, among other 
things because "... the reshaping of world industry is not giving 
rise to an economic process of capital accumulation. In contrast 
to the previous period, foreign direct investment mainly consti-
tutes a shift in the ownership and control of existing compa-
nies." 
16
 For the Spanish bid, J. P. Morgan negotiated a bridge loan 
worth US$ 1.6 billion from Citibank. 
THE STRATEGIES PURSUED BY MEXICAN FIRMS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO BECOME GLOBAL PLAYERS • ALEJANDRA SALAS-PORRAS 
144 C E P A L R E V I E W « 5 • A U G U S T 1 9 9 8 
TABLE 3 
Mexico: International securities Issues by Mexican companies 
Ai-rai/-™* * M * 11: A New York Stock v , i f , T M/, l ' 







































































































































Sources: BMV-AMIB (1995-1996); Banamex-Accivai, Semana Bursátil. 
a
 ADR/GDR: American Depositary Receipts and/or Global Depositary Receipts. 
b
 NASDAQ: National Association of Security Dealers Automated Quotation. 
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TABLE 4 
Mexico: Debt instruments for international securities markets 
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Source: International Financial Review (1992 and 1993). 
* ECP: Euro Commercial Paper. 
Distribution networks 
This is perhaps the area of activity in which big 
Mexican corporations have been working for the 
longest time. Nevertheless, the degree to which they 
have been successful in building their own distribu-
tion networks in other countries varies a lot. Success 
depends not only on the quality of the products but 
on the administrative muscle needed to coordinate 
increasingly complex production, promotion, market-
ing and distribution tasks. Moreover, very specialized 
professional teams are required to tackle foreign and 
transnational legal and institutional frameworks 
(World Trade Organization (WTO), NAFTA and other 
trading agreements). 
Until the 1980s, manufacturing exports de-
pended predominantly on the situation of the domes-
tic market. If demand was depressed, companies 
looked for other channels to orient surplus produc-
tion. From the second half of the 1980s on, foreign 
trade strategies became increasingly aggressive 
among manufacturing groups. A greater part of pro-
duction capacity was deliberately oriented towards 
foreign markets and a closer interaction of producers 
with customers -particularly TNCs in the automobile 
and electronic sectors- led the former to expand their 
distribution networks and follow their customers to 
other countries. 
As may be seen from table 5, several Mexican 
corporations have considerably increased the propor-
tion of exports in their total revenue. Very few 
groups, however, have articulated a global system of 
distribution encompassing transportation (ships, 
trucks, terminals, distribution centres, etc.), ware-
houses, marketing, promotion agents and legal repre-
sentatives. Among the most important are Televisa, 
Cemex and Modelo. From the point of view of the 
agent, the experiences of Cemex and Modelo are par-
ticularly enlightening since they tackled powerful 
global players who were trying to prevent them from 
growing in the United States and European markets. 
To do so they had to learn a variety of procedures, 
ranging from the very sophisticated anti-dumping 
laws and GATT institutional rules to more informal 
rules and trading tricks. 
In 1988, seven cement producers from Texas, 
New Mexico, Florida and Arizona, apparently led by 
a subsidiary of the Swiss TNC Holderbank, com-
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TABLE 5 
Mexico: Exports, distribution networks and market agreements 



































































ICI America, Pilkington Bros, Agreement with GM 
Sunbelt, distribution centres, marine terminals and ships 
Representatives in United States 
Eastman Chemical, Just-in-Time agreement with Ford 
ICA Tech, ICA Construction, Tremec Trading Co 
Galavisión, Sociedad Europea 
Moctezuma Imports, Gambrinus 
Sara Lee 
Chemtech, Housmex, Just-in-Time agreements with GM, Ford 
Minera Mexico International, Western Copper Supplies 
Intercompany trading with parent 
Mid and Far East 
Intercompany trading with parent 
The Texas-Mexican Railway Co., Cardiff, Marine terminals and ships 
Representatives 
Rayon Yarn, Intermex, Jansen, Veratec (fibres & textiles) 
Agreements with travel brokers 
Pacific Steel Inc., Agreements with travel brokers 
Agreement with Mercedes-Benz 
General Products Co., Peñoles & Chemicals 
Agreement with Kellogg and representatives in the United States 
Subsidiaries in the United States and representatives in Latin America 
Representatives 
Festin Food 
ITL, TAMSA Inc., Tamtrade 
Market agreements 
Source: Expansión (1994); BMV (1994). 
plained to the United States Federal Trade Cornmis-
sion that they were being unfairly affected by low-
priced Mexican cement imports. The Trade 
Commission imposed antidumping duties ranging 
from 50% to 58%. Mexican cement exports to the 
United States dropped from 3.5 million tons to less 
than 1 million and Cemex was badly hurt, since it 
accounted for around 90% of that amount. Several 
attempts to overturn the ruling were unsuccessful, 
until in July 1992 an international panel found that 
the United States had violated the GATT antidumping 
code. United States trade representatives offered to 
do away with the antidumping duties if Mexico with-
drew its GATT complaint, kept exports to the United 
States within certain limits and prices, and opened its 
own cement market to imports. The punitive duties 
have gradually been reduced, but not eliminated (In-
terview 2). 
Cemex's geographic proximity to the United 
States represented a competitive advantage -particu-
larly when transport costs were considered- which 
no doubt troubled the adversaries who promoted this 
legal fight (the Swiss TNC Holderbank and the French 
Lafargue, ranked first and second in the world, re-
spectively). During the legal dispute, which lasted 
more than two years and has still not completely 
ended, Cemex has been forced to find new markets in 
Japan, Singapore and other Southeast Asian coun-
tries, Europe and Latin America, diversifying its net-
work of trading representatives and agents. 
The case of Modelo also highlights the new 
strategies Mexican corporations had to develop to ex-
pand to First-World markets. Between 1986 and 
1987, a brand of beer produced by Modelo -Corona 
Extra- became the second-best-selling imported beer 
in the United States, displacing Heineken as the 
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number one in California, Texas and Colorado. Very 
soon after Corona had been recognized as the sec-
ond-best-selling imported beer, a persistent rumour 
began to spread across the United States saying the 
beer was contaminated. This rumour affected certain 
regional key markets. After trying other strategies, 
Modelo's representative in the United States filed a 
US$ 3 million lawsuit against Luce & Sons, Inc., the 
The cases examined in this article all reflect a delib-
erate effort to adopt global strategies and become 
global actors. This is broadly considered as a condi-
tion for overcoming, or at least lessening, the ineffi-
ciency, lack of competitiveness and chronic shortage 
of financial resources characteristic of closed, pro-
tected and underdeveloped economies. At least four 
of the interviewees (2, 3, 4 and 8, representing 
Cemex, Carso, Alfa and Vitro, respectively) explic-
itly linked competitiveness and the possibility of de-
fending their markets (national and sectoral) to the 
adoption of global strategies. According to Vitro's 
management, for example, "As the Mexican econ-
omy opened up, the only alternative was to expand 
towards foreign markets and, simultaneously, protect 
national markets, but on the basis of the rules of the 
game of the international market." (Interview 8). 
The drive to become global is thus the strategy 
adopted in order to survive and overcome some tradi-
tional limitations and constraints characteristic of the 
national bourgeoisie, particularly inefficiency and 
widespread dependence on the State. To become 
global, Mexican entrepreneurs had to adopt a more 
active, aggressive, conscious and even self-analytical 
position. This strategic orientation presupposes that 
this segment of the national bourgeoisie takes a step 
back from the role it has been playing in the econ-
omy, examines it critically and tries to transform it. 
My interviews demonstrate that this strategic 
planning -different actions logically connected to-
gether in order to produce a specific outcome- is 
now deeply rooted as a corporate practice. Global 
strategies -that is, sets of deliberate actions aimed 
at gaining or maintaining a position in the global 
market- have transformed the predominantly inward 
Heineken distributor responsible of spreading the ru-
mour. The dispute was settled when Luce agreed to 
state publicly that Corona was not contaminated. From 
1986 to 1987 Corona increased its share in the United 
States imported beer market from 11% to 18% (whereas 
Heineken's share dropped from 29.3% to 25%). In 
1992, Modelo accounted for 69% of all Mexican beer 
exports, with sales in 59 different countries.17 
orientation of corporate metapreferences into a pre-
dominantly outward orientation. 
The global strategies formulated and imple-
mented by Mexican groups are quite comprehensive. 
They include different combinations of the turn-
around strategies18 worked out by TNCs based in ad-
vanced capitalist countries in the 1980s; new forms 
of growth by acquisition (privatization operations, 
hostile takeovers, leveraged buy-outs and manage-
ment buy-outs); positioning or benchmarking on a 
global scale; strategic alliances and networking, and 
the use of new financial instruments (commercial 
paper, Eurobonds, buying options and other financial 
devices). 
Operations on a transnational scale broaden the 
scope of action not only because top management has 
to coordinate activities in different countries but also, 
and particularly, because competitiveness and per-
formance have to be evaluated on a global scale: i.e., 
in comparison with the results of global competitors. 
This new emphasis on positioning permeates corpo-
rations' growth and turnaround strategies. Position-
ing on a global scale thus becomes one of the main 
objectives in almost all areas of corporate action. 
17
 See Wall Street Journal, 1987; Journal of Commerce, 1988, 
and Latin American Newsletters, 1993. 
18
 By turnaround strategies I understand a comprehensive corpo-
rate organization which acts on all levels of the corporation: 
financial, technological, organizational, etc. These strategies 
were first formulated in the 1970s but the different financial and 
corporate measures have changed considerably since that time. 
Among the most important new elements we find the use of 
leveraged buyouts, the issue of junk bonds to finance acquisi-
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Presentations to agents from the global market 
community19 invariably give a special space to posi-
tioning on various accounts (net income, productiv-
ity, return on assets, etc.). Annual Meeting Reports, 
offering circulars, road shows, presentations and 
other financial promotion instruments cannot evade 
the problem. Most of my interviews show that posi-
tioning has deeply transformed the logic of strategic 
management among large Mexican corporations. One 
of the most important considerations which encour-
aged Cemex to buy Sansón and La Valenciana in 
Spain was that the group would achieve a return on 
assets much greater than that of their competitors in 
Europe (Interview 2). Lorenzo Zambrano, Cemex's 
CEO, considers that in order to compete with TNCs 
from industrialized countries Mexican management 
must know them in detail, understand their strategies, 
follow their development in different countries, iden-
tify their vulnerable areas and anticipate their next 
moves (IMEF, 993, p. 10). ' 
However, firms do not necessarily adopt all the 
components of the global formulas, because their 
sectoral and/or specific situation may involve differ-
ent problems and constraints. The possible combina-
tions of strategies are thus manifold. They depend on 
the firm's financial situation and the characteristics 
of the core business, cost structure, historical strategy 
and so forth. 
Before the opening-up of the economy, most big 
Mexican companies could have been considered 
stagnant businesses: firms with under-utilized assets 
and ineffective management, by transnational stand-
ards. Under the conditions of a closed protected 
market, these firms survived in spite of then* poor 
performance, but as the economy opened they had 
to adapt to the international production environment 
if they were to stay in business. Among the» most 
popular courses of action adopted to overcome their 
competitive weakness are those prescribed by classi-
cal turn-around specialists (Bibeault, 1982 and 
Slatter, 1984): Í) Product-market reorientation, 
19
 By global market community I understand all the agents 
involved in buying and trading securities in the transnational 
markets. 
adopted by Alfa, Desc, San Luis and to a lesser 
extent VISA; ii) Cost reduction, adopted in particular 
by Alfa, Cemex, Carso and Vitro; iii) Improved 
marketing (Bancomer, Modelo); iv) Asset reduction 
(Alfa, Cemex, Carso), and v) Constitution of profes-
sional senior management and boards (Alfa, Carso, 
VISA-Bancomer). 
Turnaround strategies rapidly spread throughout 
the corporate milieu, becoming a buzzword among 
top executives. Turnaround specialists or "artists" 
emerged, sponsored and guided by transnational 
agents, consultants and investment bankers as both 
the external and internal environment and manage-
ment constraints created a turnaround situation for 
most Mexican corporations.20 The expectations of 
success are closely related to previous development 
and to the support of other agents who may benefit 
from the process. 
Carso, like Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) and 
Fortsmann Little in the United States (Useem, 1993, 
p. 318) and Trafalgar House Ltd. in England 
(Bibeault, 1982, p. 87), has made a practice of taking 
part in privatization operations and buying out 
large firms facing difficulties of different sorts. Priva-
tization of State firms has spurred quite a number of 
turnarounds, since State companies were generally 
very poorly managed. Carso was one of the groups 
which benefited most from this process. The group 
has proved quite successful in turning these ailing 
firms around through a combination of devices 
-stronger management, financial instruments, cost-
cutting and asset redeployment strategies- very 
often used in turnaround situations. Another success-
ful turnaround specialist is Lorenzo Zambrano, 
Chairman and CEO of Cemex, who has restructured 
Empresas Tolteca and implemented a similar cost-
cutting and asset reduction strategy in the recently 
acquired Spanish companies Sansón and La Valen-
ciana.21 
20
 The role these agents played in the process of corporate 
restructuring in the United States and other countries is con-
troversial. Whereas some authors (Vedder, 1989, p. 14) con-
sider they helped to make corporations more efficient and 
productive, others (Bruning, 1989, p. 53 and Brock and Adams, 
1989, pp. 34-35) think they fostered speculation and destroyed 
productive capacity and jobs. 
He is planning a similar strategy for Cementos Samper and 
Diamante, two Colombian companies acquired in May 1996. 
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VII 
Conclusions 
The compounded effects of national and international 
factors between 1982 and the early 1990s decisively 
helped to promote the globalization of Mexican 
corporations. The most important national factors 
were i) the recession of the 1980s, which forced 
groups to look for and open new markets for their 
products; ii) the negotiation of foreign debt, the op-
erations of Ficorca, and the depreciation of Mexican 
debt which linked them to new, modern and more 
sophisticated financial circuits and agents; iii) the 
opening-up of the economy and Mexico's entry into 
GATT and NAFTA, which meant less protection and 
fewer subsidies and transfers; iv) the revaluation of 
Mexican corporations in the light of the expectations 
generated by NAFTA; and v) the debt overhang, 
which created financial opportunities. 
Among the international factors, the most impor-
tant were the globalization of a growing number of 
industrial sectors, clusters and networks, which opens 
new spaces and niches for transnational corporations 
from developing countries; the fact that many TNCs 
from advanced capitalist countries are shifting then-
attention from traditional to leading-edge activities; 
the technological development in the area of commu-
nications and information, which makes possible com-
plex combinations of productive, marketing and financial 
operations; financial agents looking for and creating 
more attractive (speculative) options for investment 
in emerging markets, given the general fall in interest 
rates; and a global regulatory framework more 
concerned with quality and ecological standards.22 
As may be seen from table 6, of the 60 largest 
non-financial groups in Mexico, 37 (that is, almost 
60%) have become global corporations according to 
the definition proposed at the beginning of this 
article, i.e., with at least two types of activities in 
transnational markets (see introduction). 
22
 Although these problems are beyond the scope of this article, 
there has been a great deal of discussion of these issues since the 
expansion of the maquilas, the opening-up of the economy and 
the negotiations on NAFTA. 
Strategic alliances have become the most common 
strategy. An exhaustive survey of the business litera-
ture reveals that 29 of the 60 largest non-financial 
groups in Mexico have formed strategic alliances in 
the past five years. Only in a few cases do these 
alliances enable Mexican groups to expand their op-
erations to global markets, however, either by facili-
tating exports or in value-adding activities. 
Expansion to the securities markets is a very 
popular strategy too, since credit contracts are gradu-
ally disappearing and the Mexican capital market 
cannot satisfy the capital requirements of these large 
groups. However, not all Mexican corporations have 
the organizational capacity to quote in the interna-
tional securities markets, especially the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE). Of the 60 largest industrial-
retailing corporations as of 1994, 55 are listed on the 
Mexican Stock Exchange, 35 trade American De-
positary Receipts or Global Depositary Receipts 
(ADRS/GDRS) on international markets, only 20 are 
listed on the NYSE, and 13 offered other types of debt 
instruments from 1992 to 1993 (see tables 3 and 4). 
Only 13 groups have operating subsidiaries and 
therefore value-adding activities in their core busi-
ness abroad (table 1). A total of 24 groups have de-
veloped their own trading, manufacturing and 
marketing agreements with global corporate clients 
(see table 5). Of the motives identified by Fujita and 
others (Taylor (éd.), 1993, pp. 11-14) for promoting 
foreign direct investment (FDI), Mexican corporations 
are particularly keen on upgrading technological 
skills and increasing efficiency through rationalized 
operations and cost reduction strategies (Cemex and 
Vitro). However, market-seeking and export-oriented 
FDI tend to become more important for companies 
operating in saturated national markets (Televisa, 
Synkro, Bimbo-Baird's). Resource seeking is consid-
erably less important for Mexican firms. 
In sum, the most common trajectory is a combi-
nation of two strategies: expansion to the global se-
curities market and the formation of strategic 
alliances. As may be seen from table 6, of the 60 
groups in our sample, 37 have become global. Of 
these 37 global Mexican firms, 25 combine these two 
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strategies in some way. Six groups limit their global 
action to these areas. Although value-adding activi-
ties are not involved in this trajectory, the interaction 
with global partners and securities agents can be very 
intense, deeply transforming corporate strategies and 
organization. Most large retailing groups have fol-
lowed this trajectory. Only six Mexican groups com-
bine all four of the global strategies (table 6). 
If we compare Mexican global corporations with 
the multinational enterprises of the Third World in 
the sixties, as analysed by Khan (éd.), 1986, some 
major differences may be found with regard to in-
vestment strategies, location, mechanisms of expan-
sion and instruments to finance expansion. Whereas 
the Third World multinationals employ defensive 
strategies to expand to Third World markets in order 
to counteract the effect of recessive trends or protec-
tive measures, or in order to reduce risk through re-
gional diversification, the Mexican transnationals use 
aggressive strategies to penetrate First World mar-
kets.23 In other words, the Mexican global players 
deliberately aim at First World markets in order to 
become global forces in their respective areas of op-
eration. They do not penetrate those markets through 
arrangements with governments, handshake deals or 
joint ventures with Third World investors, as Third 
World multinationals did before (Khan (éd.), 1986), 
but rather through complex and aggressive actions 
comprising acquisitions, hostile takeovers, leveraged 
buy-outs, buying options, strategic alliances, lawsuits 
and other legal or financial manoeuvres. They gener-
ally do not depend on their own internal financial 
resources to finance their expansion. Instead, they use 
sophisticated financial devices engineered by power-
ful transnational agents who have become a key link 
in the whole process of globalization. Acquisitions, 
strategic alliances and other investment projects are 
carried out with relatively little or no fresh Mexican 
capital, but rather with bridge loans in combination 
with ADR/GDR offerings, Eurobonds, and other instru-
ments which presume the low-leverage financial 
positions achieved by Mexican groups throughout 
the 1980s, and also high cash flow potential. 
The drive to become global constitutes a survival 
strategy in the context of an open export-oriented 
23
 A United Nations study (Taylor (ed,), 1993) likewise notes 
the greater proportion of FDI channelled from Third World to 
First World countries. 
economy and increasing integration with the United 
States and Canada. The national and international 
conditions favour those groups whose competitive 
edge lies in goods demanding mature and stand-
ardized technology, where they have achieved high 
productivity, primarily through cost-cutting strategies 
(Vitro, Cemex) (Taylor (éd.), 1993). In other cases, 
globalization is achieved where, for cultural reasons, 
it would be very difficult to replace the services in 
question (retailing, television programmes). And this 
is precisely the main similarity with the multinational 
enterprises from the Third World analysed by Khan 
(ed.),1986. 
Thus, even when they become global, these cor-
porations from less developed countries exhibit 
weaknesses and shortcomings. They gain a foothold 
in non-leading and highly cyclical areas of the world 
economy (cement, steel, glass, petrochemicals), 
where they have more potential to compete on a 
global level. The Vitro-Corning strategic alliance, for 
example, was confined, even before it failed, to the 
house-ware industry division and did not include 
state-of-the-art products such as optic fibres where 
Corning has become a leading-edge producer. Even 
in the traditional production of glass containers, how-
ever, Vitro suffered a blow in 1996, when the group 
reported losses for more than US$ 400 million and 
withdrew completely from the United States market 
after selling Anchor Glass. 
Very few Mexican global corporations have 
developed towards more technologically advanced 
areas. Vitro was producing glass-manufacturing 
machinery and equipment for its subsidiaries in the 
United States (Anchor's plants), but as already noted 
it nevertheless had to withdraw from the United 
States in 1996. However, Cemex, ICA, Bl and GMD 
are exploring the production of environmentally 
friendly facilities; Televisa has bought its own satel-
lite, which will force the group to get involved and 
assimilate the technology contained in that equip-
ment, and in 1996 Carso Global Telecom began an 
aggressive process of expansion into multimedia 
activities with the acquisition of Prodigy Services. 
The better ranking of Mexican debt issues (Euro-
bonds, commercial paper, etc.) from 1992 to 1994 
has been dramatically adjusted after the devaluation 
and collapse of December 1994. Much higher rates 
have had to be offered from 1995 onwards to com-
pensate for the much higher risk. Moreover, these 
newcomers to the global scene are more vulnerable 
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to the ñnancial strategies of the open market and 
even to institutional investors and transnational fi-
nancial engineers who are permanently monitoring 
their decisions and performance and can provoke in-
stability in the price of their shares and their financial 
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